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1 Introduction
The international transmission of U.S. monetary policy and China*s exchange
rate policy during the recent global recession have been topics of heated de-
bate. The U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) has been accused of competitive deval-
uation, which deliberately attempts to depreciate the dollar and stimulate
the U.S. economy andin particularits exports at the expense of the rest
of the world. Stiglitz (2008 & 2010), for instance, argues that U.S. interest
rate reductions are a beggar-thy-neighbor policy as they have depreciated
the dollar and helped to export the weakness of the U.S. economy to other
countries.
Rajan (2011) argues that expansionary U.S. monetary policy represents
a threat not only to the rest of the world, but also to the U.S. itself. The
argument goes as follows: U.S. interest rate reductions are followed by iden-
tical cuts everywhere, because no country wants its currency to appreciate
strongly against the dollar. Consequently, the Fed ends up setting monetary
policy for the rest of the world also. Expansionary U.S. monetary policy that
is appropriate for the U.S. economy may be overly aggressive for emerging
markets, where it leads to asset bubbles and in ation. If the rest of the world
then becomes reluctant to fund U.S. spending, the adjustment will be painful
for the U.S. also.
The Economist (2011) emphasized that 66 countries have either adopted
the dollar as legal tender, pegged their currency to it or manage their ex-
change rate against it. The dollar bloc*s collective GDP was almost 9 trillion
dollars, or about 14% of the world economy. The dollar bloc comprises oil
producers and developing countries. Erceg et al. (2011) mention that var-
ious motivations for the dollar peg have been o¤ered, including the desire
to keep currencies weak and exports competitive and to avoid the adverse
e¤ects of exchange rate  uctuations on the balance sheets of domestic rms
and households. The dollar peg also serves as a strong and easily understood
anchor for monetary policy (Abed et al. 2003).
The largest member of the dollar blocby faris China. It has engaged
in massive currency manipulation to keep the yuan weak and its exports
competitive during the global recession, when the Fed has cut interest rates
aggressively. Krugman (2010) argues that this is "the most distortionary
exchange rate policy any major nation has ever followed", and the U.S. Trea-
sury should label China as a currency manipulator. Importantly, political
pressure to do so has been rising (The Economist 2010).
In this paper, I use a New Keynesian open-economy model to examine the
consequences of developing countries*including China*sdollar peg for the
international transmission of U.S. monetary policy. I assume that the dollar
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bloc pegs the exchange rate to the dollar by following U.S. monetary policy.
In addition, I assume that all export prices are set in U.S. dollars, which I
refer to as dollar pricing. The assumption of dollar pricing is consistent with
the empirical evidence of Goldberg and Tille (2008), who nd that 99.8% of
U.S. exports and 92.8% of U.S. imports are invoiced in dollars.
The implications of China*s currency manipulation has been actively de-
bated. This paper contributes to the debate, rst, by analyzing the conse-
quences of China*s dollar peg for the e¤ectiveness of U.S. monetary policy.
More important, I evaluate the value of the dollar peg for the dollar bloc and
the U.S. I measure the value of the dollar peg as a fraction of consumption
that households would be willing to pay for the dollar peg to remain as well
o¤ under the dollar peg as under a  exible exchange rate.
The theme is related to a classic question of whether pegging the exchange
rate is optimal. Since the publication of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), a stand
of the recent literature has analyzed the optimal choice of the exchange rate
regime in the face of non-monetary shocks based on rigorous welfare analysis.1
This literature addresses the question of whether xing the exchange rate
during domestic shocks is optimal. However, the literature has not addressed
the question of whether it is optimal for foreign countries to x their exchange
rate during domestic monetary shocks.
I rst analyze the international e¤ects of a U.S. interest rate cut under
 exible exchange rates. This exercise shows two new results. If the elastic-
ity of substitution between domestic and foreign good (cross-country substi-
tutability, for short) is su¢ciently high and a second-order approximation of
the utility function is used, the U.S. welfare e¤ect is negative. This result
contrasts with that of Schmidt (2006), who using a rst-order approximation
of the utility function, nds that monetary expansion under dollar pricing is
a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. A second-order approximation also takes into
account the variance of employment and is qualitatively important for wel-
fare when the cross-country substitutability is high. In this case, the welfare
losses from a high variance of employment, caused by a strong expenditure
switching e¤ect, dominate the benets of monetary expansion.
It has been challenging for models to provide for the observation that the
positive correlation of output between the U.S. and foreign countries is larger
than the positive correlation of consumptions (Backus et al. 1992). Under
producer (local) currency pricing, a monetary shock generates a negative
(positive) correlation of output across countries, but a positive (negative)
correlation of consumption (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995, Betts and Devereux
1This literature includes Benigno and Benigno (2006), Devereux and Engel (2003),
Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) as well as Gali and Monacelli (2005).
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2000). Under dollar pricing and a low cross-country substitutability, outputs
are more highly correlated across countries than consumptions are, which is
consistent with the empirical evidence. This result may be relevant with re-
gards to the fact that virtually all U.S. trade is invoiced in dollars (Goldberg
and Tille 2008), and short-term estimates of the cross-country substitutabil-
ity in the U.S. are low (Hooper et al. 2000). The model can therefore explain
a key fact in international business cycles using plausible assumptions and
parameterization.
One of the main ndings of this paper is that the value of the dollar peg
is positive for the dollar bloc when U.S. interest rates fall. This provides a
rationale for xing the exchange rate to the dollar in the current environ-
ment. The positive value of the dollar peg stems from the ability of the U.S.
to improve its terms of trade and consumption at the dollar bloc*s expense
under  exible exchange rates. The dollar peg prevents this, thereby increas-
ing welfare. The dollar peg, however, has costs as well. As Rajan (2011)
suggested, the combination of the dollar peg and aggressive U.S. monetary
policy can lead to an overheating of the dollar bloc. In the model, the welfare
cost of this is captured by a high variance of employment, which tends to
decrease welfare. However, this welfare e¤ect is o¤set by the positive e¤ects.
Schnabl (2010) studies the costs and benets of the dollar peg for China
and East Asia and argues that it plays an important role in the pursuit of
macroeconomic stability in the current environment. This paper supports
the view that the benets exceed the costs, not because of macroeconomic
stability, but despite the macroeconomic instability (higher output and in-
 ation  uctuations) caused by the dollar peg.
The value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S. if the expenditure
switching e¤ect is su¢ciently weak. In such a case, U.S. monetary policy is
a beggar-thy-neighbor policy since the U.S. can raise welfare by improving
its terms of trade. The dollar peg prevents this, so its value for the U.S. is
negative.
If the expenditure switching e¤ect is su¢ciently strong, then the value
of the dollar peg is positive for the U.S. If the expenditure switching e¤ect
is strong and exchange rates are  exible, any welfare benets from higher
consumption are o¤set by welfare losses due to a high variance of employ-
ment. A strong shift in demand in the dollar bloc toward U.S. goods causes
U.S. output to increase (a high variance of employment). The dollar peg
eliminates the expenditure switching e¤ect and reduces the variance of em-
ployment, thus improving welfare. The deterioration of U.S. terms of trade,
compared to the  exible exchange rate case, reduces welfare, but this e¤ect is
overshadowed by the welfare benet of a lower variance of employment. The
results show, however, that for the quite realistic parameter combinations of
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the cross-country elasticity and the Calvo parameter, the value of the dollar
peg is negative for the U.S. This provides a novel rationale for criticism of
China*s exchange rate policy.
As mentioned, I also address the consequences of the dollar peg for the
e¤ectiveness of U.S. monetary policy. Measured by the cumulative change
in output after 10 quarters, the dollar peg, by eliminating the expenditure
switching e¤ect, reduces the ability of U.S. monetary policy to stimulate
output by 31% under benchmark parameterization, when compared cases
where the dollar bloc adheres to the Taylor rule. This result is in sharp
contrast with that of Erceg et al. (2011), who nd that the e¤ectiveness
of U.S. monetary policy is nearly invariant to assumptions about the dollar
bloc*s monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, Section 3 discusses the parameterization of the model, Section 4 analy-
ses the international transmission of U.S. monetary policy and the value of
the dollar peg, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, I develop a New Keynesian open-economy model in which
the world economy consists of two countries: the U.S. and the dollar bloc.
The dollar bloc refers to economies that have pegged their currencies to the
U.S. dollar. A continuum of rms and households are indexed by } 2 [0> 1].
Fraction q of them are located in the U.S., while fraction 1¡ q are located
in the dollar bloc.
Each rm produces a di¤erentiated good, and nominal price rigidity is
introduced via the mechanism proposed by Calvo (1983). Empirical evidence
points to the asymmetry in international price setting. Goldberg and Tille
(2008) nd that 99.8% (92.8%) of U.S. exports (imports) are invoiced in
dollars. I assume that U.S. rms set a unied price across countries and set
their export prices in dollars. Firms in the dollar bloc can "price-to-market"
and set their export prices in dollars. The assumption of asymmetric export
pricing implies that the exchange rate pass-through is zero in the U.S. and
one in the dollar bloc for those goods whose prices cannot be adjusted. In
presenting the model that follows, if the equations are symmetric across
countries, I present only the U.S. equation.
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2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the repre-
sentative U.S. household is given by
Xw (}) = Hw
1X
v=w
v¡w
"
logFv ¡ (cv (}))
2
2
#
> (1)
where H denotes the expectation operator,  is the discount factor, Fw is a
consumption index and cw(}) is the labour supply. The consumption index is
given by
Fw =
h
q
1
 (FXVw )
¡1
 + (1¡ q) 1 (FGEw )
¡1

i 
¡1
> (2)
where FXVw and F
GE
w respectively denote U.S. household consumption of U.S.
and the dollar bloc*s goods, and  A 0 measures the elasticity of substitution
between U.S. and the dollar bloc*s goods. I refer to  as the cross-country
substitutability. Consumption of domestic FXVw (}) and foreign F
GE
w (}) goods
are CES aggregates of the di¤erent brands of U.S. and the dollar bloc*s goods
FXVw =
24q¡ 1 qZ
0
(FXVw (}))
¡1
 g}
35 ¡1 > FGEw =
24(1¡ q)¡ 1 1Z
q
(FGEw (}))
¡1
 g}
35

¡1
>
where  A 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the
same country.
The consumption indexes imply that households allocate their consump-
tion according to the following equations:
FXVw (}) =
·
sXVw (})
SXVw
¸¡ ·SXVw
Sw
¸¡
Fw> FGEw (}) =
·
sGEw (})
SGEw
¸¡ ·SGEw
Sw
¸¡
Fw>
F¤XVw (}) =
·
s¤XVw (})
S ¤XVw
¸¡ ·S ¤XVw
S ¤w
¸¡
F¤w > F
¤GE
w (}) =
·
s¤GEw (})
S ¤GEw
¸¡ ·S ¤GEw
S ¤w
¸¡
F¤w =
In these equations, asterisks indicate the dollar bloc*s variables. Therefore,
F¤XVw (}) and F
¤GE
w (}) respectively denote consumption of the di¤erentiated
U.S. and the dollar bloc*s goods by the dollar bloc*s households. All price
indexes are expressed in the local currency, although U.S. rms set their ex-
port prices in dollars. Price s represents dollar prices, and price s¤ represents
foreign currency prices. The dollar price of U.S. and the dollar bloc*s goods
are denoted by sXVw (}) and s
GE
w (}), respectively. s
¤XV
w (}) and s
¤GE
w (}) are,
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respectively, the foreign currency price of U.S. and the dollar bloc*s goods.
SXVw (S
GE
w ) is the price indexes corresponding to U.S. (the dollar bloc*s)
consumption basket FXVw (F
GE
w ), and Sw is the U.S. price index.
The U.S. price indexes are dened as follows:
S XVw =
·
q¡1
Z q
0
sXVw (})
1¡ g}
¸ 1
1¡
> SGEw =
·
(1¡ q)¡1
Z 1
q
sGEw (})
1¡ g}
¸ 1
1¡
Sw =
£
q(SXVw )
1¡ + (1¡ q)(SGEw )1¡
¤ 1
1¡ = (3)
The corresponding indexes for the dollar bloc are dened similarly.
2.1.2 Budget constraints and nancial markets
Consider a cashless economy in which money is only a unit of account. The
budget constraint of the typical U.S. household, in nominal terms, is given
by
Gw = (1 + lw¡1)Gw¡1 + zwcw ¡ SwFw + w= (4)
Gw denotes nominal bonds (that pay one dollar in period w+ 1) held at the
beginning of period w, lw¡1 is the nominal interest rate on bonds between
w¡ 1 and w, z is the nominal wage paid to the household, and  denotes the
household*s share of the nominal prots (dividends) of U.S. rms. All U.S.
(dollar bloc) households own an equal share of all U.S. (dollar bloc) rms.
The structure of the dollar bloc is identical to that of the U.S. economy,
with one exception: U.S. households can hold only U.S. bonds, whereas
households in the dollar bloc can hold both U.S. and dollar bloc bonds.
Therefore, the foreign bond (I ¤), denominated in the currency of the dollar
bloc, is not traded internationally.
The budget constraint of a representative household in the dollar bloc is
G¤w
Vw
+ I ¤w = (1 + lw¡1)
G¤w¡1
Vw
+ (1 + l¤w )I
¤
w¡1 + z
¤
w c
¤
w ¡ S ¤w F¤w + ¤w = (5)
The global asset market-clearing condition for U.S. bonds requires qGw +
(1¡ q)G¤w = 0. The net supply of foreign bonds, on the other hand, is zero,
because the dollar bloc has only one representative household.
Use of the Taylor rule implies that the model must be stationary. One way
to render the model stationary is to assume that the domestic interest rate is
increasing in the level of net foreign debt (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003).
I include a risk premium for uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) that forces
external debt in the long term to return to its initial level. Following Bergin
(2006), I assume that lenders demand a higher rate of return on a country
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with large external debt. This view is supported by the empirical evidence:
highly indebted countries have higher real interest rates than do countries
with more positive external positions (Lane 2011). In addition, Bluedorn
and Bowdler (2011) show that U.S. interest rate shocks cause deviations
from UIP.
Households in the dollar bloc must be indi¤erent to holding U.S. or the
dollar bloc bonds. The log-linear version of UIP with a risk premium (#)
can be expressed as
(1¡  )^~w = (1¡ )^~¤w + HwV^w+1 ¡ V^w ¡ #G^w> (6)
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the sub-
script zero) are denoted by hats (e.g., ~^w = glw@l0). Equation (6) shows that
households must pay a small cost if its bond holdings do not equal their
initial steady-state level (i.e., zero).
The optimal behavior of households is governed by the following equa-
tions:
Hw(Sw+1Fw+1) = (1 + lw)SwFw> (7)
Hw(S ¤w+1F
¤
w+1) = (1 + l
¤
w )S
¤
w F
¤
w > (8)
cw(}) =
zw
FwSw
> (9)
c¤w (}) =
z¤w
F¤w S ¤w
= (10)
Equations (7) and (8) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and
foreign consumption, respectively. Equations (9) and (10) show that the
labour supply is an increasing function of real wages and a decreasing function
of consumption.
2.2 Monetary policy
The U.S. central bank follows the log-linear Taylor rule with interest rate
smoothing:
~^w = (1¡ 1)(2¢S^w + 3|^w) + 1 ~^w¡1 + w> (11)
where coe¢cients 1, 2 and 3 are non-negative, ¢ is the rst di¤erence
operator, and w is an unpredictable shift in the monetary policy rule (zero
mean white noise process). Equation (11) shows that the in ation target is
zero. The output gap is dened as the deviation of output from the equi-
librium level that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities. In this
paper, I analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy and therefore the deviation
of output from the initial level measures the output gap.
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To evaluate the consequences of the dollar peg, I contrast the  exible
exchange rate case in which the central bank of the dollar bloc follows the
Taylor rule, which is identical to (11), with an alternative in which the central
bank pegs the exchange rate. Erceg et al. (2011) use this same approach.
For simplicity, I assume that the central bank of the dollar bloc pegs the
exchange rate by mimicking U.S. monetary policy (^~w = ~^¤w ).
A typical view is that most dollar bloc countries are to some extent forced
to follow U.S. monetary policy. Rogo¤ (2008) pointed out that during the
U.S. nancial crisis, "[d]ollar bloc countries have slavishly mimicked expan-
sionary US monetary policy". However, the question of whether China has
been able to implement independent monetary policy is complicated. Koivu
(2009) points out that China*s monetary policy has relied on a xed exchange
rate, capital controls and a selection of administrative and quantitative pol-
icy tools. Ma and McCauley (2008) nd that capital controls have proved
e¤ective. Cheung et al. (2008) nd that U.S. interest rates have a weak
e¤ect on China. They argue that even with the dollar peg, China employs
measures to retain its monetary policy independence.
Koivu (2009) points out that many features of China*s monetary policy
have changed in recent years. First, the role of interest rates has increased. In
20062007, the central bank increased the use of interest rates in an attempt
to keep rising in ation under control. Second, since the summer of 2003,
growing capital in ows have increased liquidity in China*s nancial markets
and have complicated the conduct of monetary policy (Koivu 2009). Glick
and Hutchison (2009) and Prasad (2008) nd that the xed exchange rate
constrains China*s monetary policy independence. Zhang (2009) shows that
although money supply has been a dominant policy instrument in China in
the past decades, a Taylor with interest rate smoothing that responses to
the output gap and contemporary and expected in ation illustrates China*s
more recent monetary policy well.
Frankel (2010) nds that in 2007-2008, sterilization nally faltered and
money growth became excessive. Bordo et al. (2012) nd that China*s
sterilized foreign-exchange intervention fails to provide the central bank with
a mechanism for systematically altering the exchange rate independently of
its monetary policy. Moreover, Wolf (2008) argues that "Ben Bernanke is
running the monetary policy of the People*s Bank of China." Although the
assumption that China follows U.S. monetary policy is a poor re ection of
reality, it nonetheless provides a simple way to peg the currency to the dollar.
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2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Prots
All rms produce a di¤erentiated good. The production function of the
representative U.S. rm is
|w (}) = cw (}) > (12)
where |w (}) is the total output of rm }, and cw (}) is the labour input that
rm } uses.
The prots of the U.S. rm are given by
w (}) = s
XV
w (}) |
g
w (})¡ zwcw (}) = (13)
The rm takes into account the production function (13) and the demand
curve for its products
|gw (}) =
·
sXVw (})
S XVw
¸¡ ·SXVw
Sw
¸¡
qFw +
·
sXVw (})
SXVw
¸¡ · SXVw
VwS ¤w
¸¡
(1¡ q)F¤w =
The prots of the U.S. rm, therefore, can be written as
w (}) =
¡
sXVw (})¡ zw
¢ £ (14)"·
sXVw (})
S XVw
¸¡ ·SXVw
Sw
¸¡
qFw +
·
sXVw (})
SXVw
¸¡ · SXVw
VwS ¤w
¸¡
(1¡ q)F¤w
#
=
As mentioned in Section 2, rms in the dollar bloc can "price-to-market"
and set their prices in the currency of the buyer. The total output of the
representative rm in the dollar bloc, |¤w (}), is divided between the output
sold in the U.S., y¤w (}), and the output sold in the dollar bloc, {
¤
w (}). Its
prots are given by
¤w (}) = (s
GE
w (}) y
¤
w (}))@Vw + s
¤GE
w (}) {
¤
w (})¡ z¤w c¤w (}) = (15)
The demand for the dollar bloc*s goods are given by
y¤w (}) =
·
sGEw (})
SGEw
¸¡ ·SGEw
Sw
¸¡
qFw> (16)
{¤w (}) =
·
s¤GEw (})
S ¤GEw
¸¡ ·S ¤GEw
S ¤w
¸¡
(1¡ q)F¤w = (17)
Equations (16) and (17) show demand in the U.S. and in the dollar bloc,
respectively.
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2.3.2 Price setting
U.S. rms maximize their prots, specied in Equation (14), with respect to
sXVw (}). In the absence of price rigidities, this would imply
sXVw (}) =

 ¡ 1zw= (18)
Under the Calvo pricing assumption, each rm may reset its price in any
given period with a probability of 1¡, independently of other rms and the
elapsed time since the last adjustment. When setting a new price in period
w, the rm seeks to maximize the discounted present value of expected real
prots
max
sXVw (})
Yw (}) = Hw
1X
v=w
v¡wTw>v
v (})
Sv
>
where Tw>v is a stochastic discount factor between periods w and v. The U.S.
rm*s optimization problem results in the following pricing rule:
sXVw (}) =
µ

 ¡ 1
¶
Hw
P1
v=w 
v¡wTw>vDvzv
Hw
P1
v=w 
v¡wTw>vDv
> (19)
where
Dv =
µ
1
SXVv
¶¡ µS XVv
Sv
¶¡µqFv
Sv
¶
+
µ
1
S XVv
¶¡µ SXVv
HvS ¤v
¶¡µ
(1¡ q)F¤v
Sv
¶
=
The log-linear version of Equation (19) can be written as
s^XVw (}) = Hws^
XV
w+1(}) + (1¡ )z^w=
The optimal price is the weighted average of current and future nominal
marginal costs.
The representative rm in the dollar bloc seeks to maximize
max
sGEw (})>s
¤GE
w (})
Y ¤w (}) = Hw
1X
v=w
v¡wT¤w>v
¤v (})
S ¤v
=
The pricing rules are given by
sGEw (}) =
µ

 ¡ 1
¶ HwP1v=w v¡wT¤w>v ³FvSv´³ 1SGEv ´¡ ³SGEvSv ´¡ z¤v
Hw
P1
v=w 
v¡wT¤w>v
³
Fv
Sv
´³
1
SGEv
´¡ ³
SGEv
Sv
´¡ ³
1
Vv
´ > (20)
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s¤GEw (}) =
µ

 ¡ 1
¶ HwP1v=w v¡wT¤w>v ³FvSv´³ 1SGEv ´¡ ³SGEvSv ´¡ z¤v
Hw
P1
v=w 
v¡wT¤w>v
³
Fv
Sv
´³
1
S¤GEv
´¡ ³
S¤GEv
Sv
´¡ = (21)
The log-linear versions of these equations can be expressed as
s^GEw (}) = Hws^
GE
w+1(}) + (1¡ )(z^¤w + Vw)= (22)
s^¤GEw (}) = Hws^
¤GE
w+1 (}) + (1¡ )z^¤w = (23)
Equation (22) shows that the optimal price of the dollar bloc*s good sold
in the U.S. is the weighted average of current and future nominal marginal
costs and the exchange rate.
2.4 Symmetric equilibrium
Consider a symmetric case in which every rm that changes its price in any
given period chooses the same price and output. This implies that in each
period, a fraction of rms (1 ¡ ) sets a new price, and the price of the
remaining fraction remains unchanged.
The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy is derived with
Equations (4) and (13):
SwFw>= sXVw (}) |w (}) + (1 + lw¡1)Gw¡1 ¡Gw= (24)
The corresponding foreign equation, which takes into account the global asset
market-clearing condition for U.S. bonds and that the net supply of the bond
in the dollar bloc is zero, is
S ¤w F
¤
w = (s
GE
w (}) y
¤
w (}))@Vw+s
¤GE
w (}) {
¤
w (})¡(1+lw¡1)
q
1¡ q
Gw¡1
Vw
+
q
1¡ q
Gw
Vw
=
I use a log-linearized version of the model around a symmetric steady
state in which initial net foreign assets are zero (G0 = 0). Equations (9),
(12) and (18) imply that the initial level of employment is given by
|0 = c0 =
µ
 ¡ 1

¶1
2
=
Equilibrium is dened as sequences of variables that clear the labour and
goods markets in both countries every period and satisfy pricing rules and
intertemporal budget constraints.
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3 Parameter values
The parameterization of the model is chosen to match features of the U.S.
and the dollar bloc. Periods are interpreted as quarters. The discount factor
 is set to 0.99, which implies a steady state real interest rate of about 4%. As
mentioned in Section 2, The Economist (2011) found that the dollar bloc*s
collective GDP was almost 9 trillion dollars at that time. U.S. GDP was
roughly 14 trillion dollars at that time. Consequently, the relative size of the
U.S. economy (q) is set to 0.6. In comparison, Erceg et al. (2011) set the
size of the U.S. economy relative to the dollar bloc to 0.55, but argue that
their parameterization overstates the size of the dollar bloc.
The interest rate smoothing parameter (1) is set to 0.79, which is con-
sistent with Clarida et al. (2000). Based on Taylor (1993), 2 is set to 1.5
and 3 is set to 0.5/4. Zhang (2009) nds that before China returned to the
dollar peg in mid-2008 the interest rate smoothing parameter was 0.76 and
the weight of in ation (the annual output gap) was 0.94 (0.47). Therefore,
the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing is not unrealistic description of
monetary policy in China.
Based on Bergin (2006), the risk premium in UIP (#) is set to 0.004.
This implies that a net foreign debt of 10% of output increases the domestic
interest rate by four basis points relative to that of the foreign country. Based
on Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), the within-country substitutability ()
is set to 6. This value is widely used in the business cycle literature.
In this paper, I analyze the consequences of the dollar peg for the ability
of U.S. monetary policy to stimulate output. The price rigidity parameter ()
is therefore a key parameter for the question at hand, because it governs the
strength and duration of the expenditure switching e¤ect. Consequently, it is
important to set the parameter to match the empirical evidence on the price
rigidities of internationally traded goods. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) nd
that the trade-weighted median price duration is 12.8 (10.6) months for U.S.
exports (imports). I therefore set  to 0.75, which implies that an average
delay between price adjustments of four quarters.
The cross-country substitutability  is another key parameter for the
theme of this paper. Tille (2001) shows that it is a key parameter in deter-
mining the international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. It also in uences
the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect. Using U.S. data, Broda and
Weinstein (2006) nd that the median estimate of the cross-country substi-
tutability ranges between 2.3 and 3.7, depending on the aggregation level
and time period. Feenstra et al. (2011) nd that the median estimate of the
micro elasticity (substitution between di¤erent import suppliers) between
U.S. and foreign countries is roughly 3, while the macro elasticity (substi-
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tution between home production and imports) does not signicantly di¤er
from unity.
Hooper et al. (2000) estimate the short- and long-term price elasticities
of exports and imports for G7 countries. They nd that the sum of the
short-term elasticities for imports and exports exceeds one in absolute value
only in the U.S. For the U.S. it is 1.1; for Japan, it is 0.6. The elasticities,
however, increase over time and typically exceed one in the long term. The
sum of the long-term elasticities for the U.S. is 1.8; for Japan, it is 1.3.
I set  to 2, which is the average of the estimates for the U.S. provided
by Broda and Weinstein (2006), Feenstra et al. (2011) and Hooper et al.
(2000). However, I analyze the sensitivity of key results using the values 0.5,
1, 3, 4, 6 and 9.2
4 International transmission of U.S. mone-
tary policy
4.1 U.S. monetary policy under  exible exchange rates
The main innovation of this paper is to evaluate the value of the dollar peg
relative to the  exible exchange rate. Therefore, I begin by analyzing the
international e¤ects of a U.S. interest rate cut under  exible exchange rates.
Many of these results are not relevant per se; they provide a useful benchmark
to put into context the results of the following section.
The dynamic e¤ects of this exercise appear in panels (a)-(h) of Figure 1
(on page 31). In all gures, the horizontal axis denotes time. The vertical
axis typically shows percentage deviations from the initial steady state.3 The
responses of in ation and interest rates, however, are expressed as percentage
point deviations in annual terms. The U.S. terms of trade, shown in Figure
1(d), are dened as the Calvo-weighted relative price of U.S. exports in terms
of U.S. imports. If the index rises, the U.S. terms of trade improve.
Figure 1(e) shows that I analyze the e¤ects of a decrease of 25 basis points
(bp) in the annual U.S. interest rate (i.e. the annual interest rate is lowered
from roughly 4% to 3.75%). The 25 basis point reduction in the interest rate
might not seem to be a realistic description of the response of the Fed to
the crisis: the interest rate was driven all the way to zero and the Fed has
indicated that it will pursue the zero rate interest policy for a long time. The
Fed, however, has typically adjusted the interest rate gradually, in a series of
2I solve the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
3The change in bond holding, whose initial steady state is zero, is expressed as a
deviation form initial consumption.
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25 or 50 basis point steps in the same direction. The Fed*s recent monetary
policy can, therefore, seen as a series of 25 basis points reductions in the
policy rate.
Figure 1(c) demonstrates that a U.S. interest rate reduction depreciates
the nominal exchange rate. The U.S. interest rate is temporarily low relative
to the dollar bloc*s interest rate. Since UIP holds, the exchange rate must
depreciate to a point where it will appreciate until it reaches the steady-state
level.
In the dollar pricing case, the exchange rate pass-through to import price
is one in the dollar bloc and zero in the U.S for those goods whose prices
cannot be adjusted. In the dollar bloc, the dollar*s depreciation implies
that U.S. goods become cheaper relative to the dollar bloc*s goods. This
shifts demand toward U.S. goods and away from the dollar bloc*s goods.
This expenditure switching e¤ect increases U.S. output and tends to decrease
the dollar bloc*s output. Due to a low cross-country substitutability, this
e¤ect is relatively weak and dominated by the direct demand increase of
U.S. households. The exchange rate pass-through is zero in the U.S., and a
rise in U.S. demand increases both U.S. and the dollar bloc*s output. Output,
therefore, also increases in the dollar bloc in the short term.
A low interest rate raises consumption in both regions. In the dollar
pricing case, the dollar*s depreciation reduces the dollar bloc*s earnings in its
own currency (see Equation (15)). This and the expenditure switching e¤ect
increase relative U.S. consumption. U.S. households smooth consumption
over time and save part of this income by running a current account surplus
in the short term (Figure 1(g)). The risk premium in UIP compels bond
holdings of the U.S. households to return to the initial level in the long term.
They therefore use accumulated wealth to nance consumption and bond
holdings begins to wane.
The next step is to implement welfare analysis. Following Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2007), it has become common to evaluate the welfare cost of policy
A relative to policy B, expressing the welfare di¤erence in the percentage of
consumption that households are willing to give to be as well o¤ under policy
A as under policy B. Later in this paper, I evaluate the value of the dollar peg
as the percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay
for the dollar peg in order to be as well o¤ under the dollar peg as under a
 oating exchange rate. To measure welfare in an identical way under  exible
exchange rates, I now measure the welfare benet of monetary policy as the
percentage of consumption that households would be willing to pay for U.S.
monetary expansion to remain as well o¤ in the monetary expansion case as
in the initial steady state.
As shown in Tervala (2012), the discounted present value (DPV) of the
14
welfare benet of monetary policy relative to the initial steady state, denoted
by GSY , is given by:
GSY = 100£ [exp((1¡ )(
1X
v=w
v¡w(F^v ¡ c20c^v ¡ c20c^2v))¡ 1]= (25)
Equation (25) measures the percentage of initial consumption that the house-
hold is willing to pay for monetary policy expansion.
Table 1: Welfare e¤ects under  exible exchange rates
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
GSY 0.10 0.11 0.071 0.025 -0.019 -0.11 -0.24
¤GSY -0.29 -0.42 -0.58 -0.70 -0.80 -0.93 -1.1
Table 1 shows the welfare e¤ects in the benchmark case ( = 2) and when
using a set of alternative parameter values for the cross-country substitutabil-
ity. It demonstrates that in the basic case, a U.S. interest rate reduction is
a beggar-thy-neighbor policy that increases U.S. welfare at the dollar bloc*s
expense. The welfare benet for U.S. households is 0.071% for their initial
consumption.
Equation (25) shows that welfare in an increasing function of the level
of consumption and a decreasing function of the level and the variance of
employment. A U.S. terms of trade improvement explains the beggar-thy-
neighbor welfare result. Monetary expansion increases in U.S. consumption
with no equivalent increase in employment. As Figure 1(d) shows, the U.S.
terms of trade improve even though prices for both U.S. exports and imports
are set in dollars. In the short term, some rms can set a new price, and the
relative increase in the demand curve for U.S. rms allows them to raise the
relative price of their goods. Thus, U.S. terms of trade improve. This e¤ect
dominates the welfare loss that results from the variance of employment. The
drop in the dollar bloc*s welfare stems from a deterioration of its terms of
trade and the variance of employment.
Table 1 shows that a decrease in the dollar bloc*s welfare is a robust
nding. A high cross-country substitutability implies a decrease in U.S.
welfare, however. In this case, a stronger expenditure switching e¤ect in the
dollar bloc increases U.S. employment, and when compared to the benchmark
case, a higher variance of U.S. employment reduces welfare. If the cross-
country substitutability is high, the welfare losses resulting from the variance
of employment dominate the welfare benet that stems from improved term
of trade.
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The nding that the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under dollar pric-
ing depend qualitatively on the cross-country substitutability does not ap-
pear in the literature. Schmidt (2006) nds that a money supply shock is a
beggar-thy-neighbor policy under dollar pricing. This paper, however, shows
that this result is not generally applicable. The results di¤er for two rea-
sons: Schmidt (2006) sets the cross-country substitutability to 1.5 and uses
a rst-order approximation of the utility function. This paper shows that
a second-order term related to the variance of employment is qualitatively
important for welfare in cases of a high cross-country substitutability. If I use
a rst-order approximation of the utility function in equation (25), I will also
nd a positive welfare e¤ect in cases of a high cross-country substitutability.
Thus, the high variance of employment explains the decrease in U.S. welfare
in cases of a high cross-country substitutability.
Backus et al. (1992) show that the positive correlation of output between
the U.S. and foreign countries is greater than the positive correlation of
consumption between the U.S. and foreign countries. Providing for these ob-
servations has posed a challenge for models. In the producer (local) currency
pricing case, a monetary shock generates a negative (positive) correlation of
output across countries, but a positive (negative) correlation of consumption
(Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995, Betts and Devereux 2000). Schmidt (2006) shows
that under dollar pricing, both outputs and consumptions are positively cor-
related across countries. She, however, nds that consumptions more highly
correlate across countries than outputs. This is the outcome in this model
also.
The above discussion suggests that the cross-country substitutability af-
fects the cross-country correlation of output because it governs the strength
of the expenditure switching e¤ect in the dollar bloc. The lower the elasticity,
the weaker the expenditure switching. A low cross-country substitutability,
therefore, increases the dollar bloc*s output and reduces U.S. output. Con-
sequently, the cross-country correlation of output increases when the cross-
country substitutability decreases.
Panels (i) and (j) of Figure 1 show the response of output and consump-
tion in cases where the cross-country substitutability is one. In this case, mea-
sured by correlation coe¢cients, outputs are more highly correlated across
countries than consumptions are, a result which is consistent with the em-
pirical evidence. This result may be relevant to the fact that virtually all
U.S. trade is invoiced in dollars (Goldberg and Tille 2008) and that short-
term estimates of the cross-country substitutability are close to one in the
U.S. (Hooper et al. 2000). Thus, the model explains a key fact in interna-
tional business cycles using plausible assumptions and parameterization. It
is obvious that monetary shocks are not the sole cause of international busi-
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ness cycles, but the model can explainin contrast with most open economy
modelsthat the positive correlation of outputs is larger than the positive
correlation of consumptions.
The literature contains cases where the cross-country correlations of out-
put and consumption are in line with the empirical evidence. These results
are typically based on the assumption that shocks correlate across countries.
For instance, Corsetti et al. (2008) nd that the positive correlation of output
across countries arises mainly because of the positive correlation of innova-
tion shocks across countries. This paper demonstrates that a combination of
dollar pricing and a low cross-country substitutability can explain a stylized
fact in case of a unilateral U.S. monetary shock.
4.2 Value of the dollar peg
In this section, I analyze a case in which the dollar bloc pegs the currency
to the dollar. Figure 2 (on page 32) shows the e¤ects of a U.S. interest rate
shock identical to one discussed in the previous section. The solid lines show
the e¤ects under  exible exchange rates, and the dashed lines depict the
e¤ects in the dollar peg case.
The dollar bloc must now mimic U.S. monetary policy. Figure 2 does not
show the U.S. interest rate, but panel (h) depicts an interest rate in the dollar
bloc that is identical to the U.S. rate. An interest rate cut in both regions
implies a larger monetary expansion. Consequently, world consumption and
output increase more under the dollar peg than they would under  exible
exchange rates.
The dollar peg eliminates movement in the nominal exchange rate (Fig-
ure 2(e)), thus eliminating the expenditure switching e¤ect that increases
relative U.S. output under  exible exchange rates. Consequently, U.S. out-
put increases by less and the dollar bloc*s output increases by more than
they would under  exible exchange rates. An important implication for U.S.
monetary policy is that the dollar peg substantially reduces the e¤ectiveness
of monetary policy. I measure the loss in the ability of U.S. monetary pol-
icy to stimulate output as follows: I calculate cumulative changes in output
after ten quarters and then the percentage change caused by the dollar peg
relative to the  exible exchange rate case. As before, I use the superscripts
SHJ and I to denote the dollar peg and  oating exchange rate.
(
P10
w=1 |^
SHJ
w ¡
P10
w=1 |^
I
wP10
w=1 |^
I
w
) ¤ 100= (26)
Table 2 shows the loss in the ability of U.S. monetary policy to stimulate
output in the short term. It shows that under the benchmark parameteriza-
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tion, the dollar peg reduces the cumulated increase in output by 31%. Erceg
et al. (2011) develop a three-country model (the U.S., the dollar bloc and
the rest of the world) and nd that (their Figure 4) the dollar peg reduces
the ability of U.S. monetary policy to stimulate U.S. output relative to cases
where the dollar bloc adheres to the Taylor rule. This nding is consistent
with my nding, although Erceg et al. (2011) nd that U.S. output is nearly
invariant to assumptions about the dollar bloc*s monetary policy. I instead
nd that the loss in the e¤ectiveness of U.S. monetary policy is relatively
high. The di¤erent result is likely due to the relatively low degree of open-
ness of the U.S. economy in their model.
Table 2: Change in the e¤ectiveness of U.S. monetary policy
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
-8% -19% -31% -38% -42% -49% -56%
The dollar peg eliminates a distribution of income toward the U.S. and
thus monetary expansion does not increase relative U.S. income and U.S.
households cannot accumulate external wealth (see Figure 2(g)) for future
consumption. This implies that the risk premium in UIP plays no role in
adjustment dynamics. An identical increase in outputs implies that the in-
ternational price ratio does not change. Consequently, Figure 2(f) shows, the
U.S. terms of trade remain constant. This result is important for welfare,
because the increase in U.S. welfare under the  exible exchange rate is based
on improved terms of trade.
Figure 2(b) demonstrates that, compared to the  exible exchange rate
case, the dollar bloc*s consumption increases. The dollar bloc*s monetary
expansion and the elimination of the expenditure switching e¤ect imply a
greater increase in the dollar bloc*s output. In addition, the fact that the
dollar bloc*s terms of trade do not deteriorate increases the dollar bloc*s
consumption, in comparison to the  exible exchange rate case.
Table 3 shows that welfare increases equally in both the U.S. and the
dollar bloc. They implement identical monetary expansion, consumption and
employment increase equally, and the change in welfare therefore is identical.
Table 3: Welfare e¤ects under the dollar peg
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
GSY 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065
¤GSY 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065
The main innovation of this paper is to evaluate the value of the dollar
peg, which I dene as the percentage of consumption that households would
be willing to pay for the dollar peg in order to be as well o¤ under the dollar
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peg as under a  oating exchange rate, assuming that labour supply remains
constant.
Let XIGSY be the DPV of welfare under  oating exchange rates, and let
fFIv > cIv (})g1v=w be associated the consumption and labour supply paths:
XIGSY =
1X
v=w
v¡w
"
logFIv ¡
(cIv (}))
2
2
#
=
Let XSHJGSY be the DPV of welfare under the dollar peg, and let us dene 
SHJ
GSY
as the DPV of the welfare benet of the dollar peg. XIGSY can be written as
follows:
XSHJGSY =
1X
v=w
v¡w
"
log((1 + SHJGSY )F
I
v )¡
(cIv (}))
2
2
#
>
XSHJGSY =
1
1¡  log(1 + 
SHJ
GSY ) + X
I
GSY = (27)
Solving for SHJGSY and expressing the value of the dollar peg as the percentage
of consumption (instead of a fraction of it) yields
SHJGSY = 100£ [exp(1¡ )(XSHJGSY ¡ XIGSY )¡ 1]= (28)
Second-order approximations of the utility function are
gXSHJGSY = X
SHJ
GSY ¡ X0 =
1X
v=w
v¡w(F^SHJw ¡ c20c^SHJw ¡ c20(c^SHJw )2)> (29)
gXIGSY = X
I
GSY ¡ X0 =
1X
v=w
v¡w(F^Iw ¡ c20c^Iw ¡ c20(c^Iw )2)> (30)
where the superscript SHJ and I serve to denote the dollar peg and  oating
exchange rate. Making use of Equations (29) and (30), Equation (28) can be
written as follows:
SHJGSY = 100£ [exp((1¡ )(
1X
v=w
v¡w(F^SHJv ¡ c20c^SHJv ¡ c20(c^SHJv )2)
¡(
1X
v=w
v¡w(F^Iv ¡ c20c^Iv ¡ c20(c^Iv )2)))¡ 1]= (31)
Equation (31) measures the value of the dollar peg as the percentage of
consumption that the domestic household is willing to pay for the dollar peg
in order to be as well o¤ under the dollar peg as under the  oating exchange
rate. Consequently, a positive value for the dollar peg implies that households
are better o¤ under the dollar peg.
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Table 4: Value of the dollar peg
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
SHJGSY -0.096 -0.10 -0.065 -0.019 0.030 0.12 0.25
¤SHJGSY 0.30 0.43 0.59 0.71 0.81 0.95 1.1
Table 4 shows that the value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S. when
the cross-country elasticity is su¢ciently low. U.S. households are willing to
pay part of their consumption to eliminate the dollar peg. On the other
hand, the households in the dollar bloc are always better o¤ under the dollar
peg. This provides a rationale for the dollar bloc to peg the currency to the
U.S. dollar. To the best of my knowledge, these results are all new, since the
existing literature contains no analyses of the value of the dollar peg relative
to cases where countries adhere to the Taylor rule.
The positive value of the dollar peg for the dollar bloc stems from the
ability of the U.S. to improve its terms of trade at the dollar bloc*s expense.
The dollar peg prevents this, and in essence renders the dollar bloc a closed
economy: its consumption and output increase by equally. This increases
welfare in the model. Due to imperfect competition, the levels of consump-
tion and output are ine¢ciently low, and interest rate reductions bring them
temporarily closer to an e¢cient level, thereby increasing welfare. The vari-
ance of employment, however, tends to decrease welfare, but this e¤ect is
more than o¤set by the positive e¤ect. The positive value of the dollar peg
comes from the fact that the dollar peg prevents the U.S. from deteriorating
the dollar bloc*s terms of trade and forces monetary expansion in the dollar
bloc.
The value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S. if the cross-country
elasticity is low. In the case of the dollar peg, U.S. interest rate reductions
do not raise U.S. consumption by improving its terms of trade. The dollar
peg prevents the U.S. from improving its terms of trade at the dollar bloc*s
expense. Consequently, the dollar peg is harmful to the U.S. Table 3, how-
ever, shows that U.S. interest rate reductions increase welfare, but the value
of the dollar peg is nonetheless negative.
As Table 4 shows, the value of the dollar peg is negative for the U.S. if
the cross-country substitutability is high. In this case, the welfare benets
of higher consumption are o¤set by the welfare losses from a high variance of
employment under  exible exchange rates. When the dollar bloc xes their
currencies to the dollar, U.S. monetary policy more weakly a¤ects U.S. output
and employment. This is because the dollar peg eliminates the expenditure
switching e¤ect in the dollar bloc that strongly increases U.S. employment if
the cross-country substitutability is high. The dollar peg therefore reduces
the variance of employment, which increases welfare. The deterioration of
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U.S. terms of trade (compared to the  exible exchange rate case) reduces
welfare, but this e¤ect is o¤set by the welfare benet coming from a reduction
in the variance of employment.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The above discussion suggests that employment depends on the strength of
the expenditure switching e¤ect that, in turn, is a¤ected by the speed of price
adjustment. This is important for welfare since the variance of employment
is a key factor in welfare results. I therefore carry out a sensitivity analysis to
assess whether the results regarding the value of the dollar peg are sensitive to
a change in this parameter. The Calvo parameter is often set to 0.5, implying
an average delay of six months (2 periods) between price adjustments. This is
consistent with the estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004), which are based on
U.S. retail prices. Now prices are more  exible, so the expenditure switching
e¤ect becomes weaker and fades away faster.
Table 5 shows the welfare e¤ects of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. welfare
under  exible exchange rates. Table 6 shows the value of the dollar peg for the
U.S. I focus exclusively on the U.S. because a change in the Calvo parameter
does not a¤ect (qualitatively) results for the dollar bloc. The second row of
these tables show the results under the benchmark parameterization ( =
0=75) and the third row using a value of  = 0=5.
Table 5: Sign of the welfare e¤ect under  exible exchange rates
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
GSY >  = 0=75 + + + + - - -
GSY >  = 0=5 + + + + + + -
Table 5 shows that more  exible prices increase the threshold value of
the cross-country substitutability required for a negative welfare e¤ect. As
discussed above, when the expenditure switching e¤ect is strong (prices are
sticky, and the cross-country substitutability is su¢ciently high), the welfare
losses from a high variance of employment o¤set the positive welfare e¤ects
of monetary policy. As prices become more  exible, the change in the inter-
national price ratio caused by the depreciation of the dollar is smaller and
diminishes faster. Consequently, the expenditure switching weakens. A lower
value for  substantially reduces the positive e¤ects of monetary policy on
U.S. output in cases where  = 6. The detrimental e¤ect of a high variance
of employment therefore diminishes. In this case, a lower value for the Calvo
parameter ( = 0=5) leads to a qualitative change: the welfare losses of a
variance of employment are now dominated by the welfare benets of higher
consumption.
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Table 6: Sign of the value of the dollar peg
 = 0=5  = 1  = 2  = 3  = 4  = 6  = 9
SHJGSY >  = 0=75 - - - - + + +
SHJGSY >  = 0=5 - - - - - - +
Table 6 shows that a change in the Calvo parameter leads to a qualitative
change in the value of the dollar peg for the U.S. in cases where  = 4 and  =
6. As just noted, the harmful welfare e¤ect of a high variance of employment
is now more than o¤set by the welfare benet of higher consumption. The
U.S. can therefore increase its consumption by improving its terms of trade
at the expense of the dollar bloc. The dollar peg eliminates this so the value
of the dollar peg also becomes negative for the U.S. in cases where  = 4 and
 = 6.
The benchmark economy for welfare comparisons is the one with the
 exible exchange rate case, under which both countries follow a Taylor rule
(TR, for short) with interest rate smoothing. This may be too narrow and
it is interesting to use di¤erent monetary policy rules for the dollar bloc as a
benchmark to examine the welfare benets of the dollar peg. I analyze the
consequences of three alternative monetary policy rule for the dollar bloc.
The rst rule is the Taylor without interest rate smoothing (TRw/oS, for
short), i.e. 1 = 0 in equation (11). The second is the in ation-based Taylor
rule (ITR, for short) without interest rate smoothing, i.e. 1 = 3 = 0. The
third rule is the domestic in ation-based Taylor rule (DITR, for short)4
~^¤w = 2¢S^
¤GE
w =
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: the value of the dollar peg
TR TRw/oS ITR DITR
SHJGSY -0.065 -0.065 -0.064 -0.064
¤SHJGSY 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
Table 7 shows the value of the dollar peg under the four di¤erent policy
rules for the dollar peg in the case where the cross-country substitutability is
two. The table shows that it is a robust nding that the dollar peg is harmful
to the U.S. but benecial for the dollar peg in the case of expansionary U.S.
monetary policy. The dollar bloc*s monetary policy rule has very limited
impact on the value of the dollar peg. The main reason for this is that under
all rules the response of the dollar bloc*s central bank is very mild.
4Gali and Monacelli (2005) use the second and third rule to analyse monetary policy
for a small open economy.
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4.4 Discussion
The positive value of the dollar peg for developing countries provides a ra-
tionale for xing their currencies to the dollar during a period of aggressive
U.S. monetary policy. It is worth noting that, while China has closely mon-
itored the yuan*s movements against the dollar, it has not always followed
a tight dollar peg. China allowed mild  uctuations in the nominal exchange
rate after 2005 until it returned to the pre-2005 tight dollar peg in mid-2008,
when the Fed aggressively cut interest rates. This supports the view that,
while the tight dollar peg may not be optimal all the timeespecially when
the Fed raises interest ratesit could be optimal when the Fed cuts interest
rates aggressively.
The theme of this paper is related to a classic question of whether pegging
a country*s exchange rate is benecial. Friedman (1953) nds that shocks
require the adjustment of relative price levels between countries and that
because internal prices are highly in exible, the exchange rate should be
 exible. Feldstein (1992) argues that domestic de ation is likely to require
a period of increased unemployment, so a decline in the nominal exchange
rate would prove benecial. Devereux and Engel (2003, 766) argue that
"[t]his reasoning has led to the well-known traditional recommendation to
monetary policy makers in open economies: an optimal monetary policy in
an open economy requires exchange-rate  exibility."
Since the publication of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), some studies have
analyzed the optimal choice of the exchange rate regime in the face of non-
monetary shocks based on rigorous welfare analysis. Devereux and Engel
(2003) nd that the xed ( oating) exchange rate regime is desirable un-
der local (producer) currency pricing for a small economy in the presence of
country-specic real shocks. Duarte and Obstfeld (2008), however, nd that
the results depend on the prediction that international consumption levels
will remain perfectly synchronized under  exible prices. More general modi-
cations of the model that produce nonsynchronous consumption movements
make  exible exchange rates optimal.
Gali and Monacelli (2005) analyze the welfare e¤ects of a (1%) domestic
technology shock in a small open economy using a second-order approxima-
tion method. They nd that a xed exchange rate results in a welfare loss of
some 0.03% of initial consumption relative to the optimal monetary policy
rule. Benigno and Benigno (2006) show that the  oating (xed) exchange
rate regime is desirable in cases of productivity (mark-up) shocks. The opti-
mal exchange rate regime depends therefore on the type of disturbance. This
literature, however, has not addressed the question of whether the xed ex-
change rate is optimal for the foreign country in cases of domestic monetary
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shocks. One of the main ndings of this paper, therefore, is that it is also
optimal for the dollar bloc to x the exchange rate in cases of U.S. monetary
expansion.
The existing literature, however, describes various motivations for the
exchange rate peg in developing countries. However, Mishkin (1998) argues
that costs exceed benets, such as providing an anchor for monetary policy.
These costs include the loss of an independent monetary policy, exposure to
the transmission of the anchor country*s shocks, the increased likelihood of
speculative attacks and weakened accountability in pursuing anti-in ationary
policies. The biggest problem is that an exchange rate peg can increase
nancial instability and heighten the potential for nancial crises. Frankel
(1998), on the other hand, argues that the optimal exchange rate regime
varies depending on the specic circumstances of the country in question
and the circumstances of the time period in question.
During the global nancial crisis, the e¤ects of aggressive U.S. monetary
policy on macroeconomic and nancial stability in the dollar bloc have drawn
attention. Rajan (2011) and Wolf (2008) argue that U.S. monetary policy
leads to an overheating of the dollar bloc and rising in ation. Rajan (2011,
107) argues that these lead to "very real problems". On the other hand,
Schnabl (2010) analyses the costs and benets of the dollar peg for China
and East Asia and argues that the dollar peg plays a crucial role in the
pursuit of macroeconomic stability. This model supports the view of Rajan
(2011) and Wolf (2008) that exposure to U.S. monetary policy may lead to an
overheating of the dollar bloc: in the model, the dollar bloc*s output increases
substantially, in comparison to the  exible exchange rate case (recall Figure
2(b)). However, the dollar peg is optimal, from the welfare point of view,
even though the high variance of employment is taken into account.
Figure 2(j) shows that under the dollar peg, expansionary U.S. monetary
policy leads to rising in ation in the dollar bloc. This result is consistent
with that of Erceg et al. (2011), who nd that the response of core in ation
in the dollar bloc depends qualitatively on whether the dollar bloc pegs the
currency or adheres to the Taylor rule. Thus, Rajan*s (2011) and Wolf*s
(2008) arguments that expansionary U.S. monetary policy may be too ag-
gressive for the dollar bloc, thereby creating in ation, seems justied. The
model, however, does not support the view that an overheating of the dollar
bloc and in ation would lead to real problems: the boom is followed by a
slightly negative output gap in the medium term because short term in ation
has reduced the real wage below the steady state value.
Several U.S. economists have criticized China*s exchange rate policy dur-
ing the nancial crisis. Ben Bernanke, for instance, argues that China*s
exchange rate policy is blocking a normal recovery process in the global econ-
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omy, a shift in demand towards the struggling U.S. economy (BBC 2011).
The model supports this view, since the dollar peg limits the e¤ectiveness of
U.S. monetary policy to stimulate U.S. output and prevents improvement in
the U.S. current account. In the current environment, in which the U.S. has
a current account decit and an unemployment problem while many dollar
bloc countries enjoy near full employment and have substantial current ac-
count surpluses, the dollar peg prevents an advantageous rebalancing in the
world economy. Moreover, the results suggest that for the apparently real-
istic parameter combinations of the cross-country elasticity and the Calvo
parameter, the value of the dollar peg for the U.S. is negative. This provides
a novel rationale for criticism of China*s exchange rate policy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the consequences of the dollar peg during expansion-
ary U.S. monetary policy. The dollar peg has important implications both
for the U.S. and the dollar bloc. A key nding is that the value of the dollar
peg is positive for the dollar bloc, since it prevents the U.S. improving its
terms of trade at the expense of the dollar bloc. This provides a rationale
for xing the exchange rate to the dollar. The dollar peg, however, leads to
an overheating of the economy and rising in ation in the dollar bloc.
The value of the dollar peg, for a wide range of the parameter combina-
tions of the cross-country substitutability and the price rigidity parameter,
is negative for the U.S. This provides a rationale for the U.S. to criticize the
dollar bloc*s (China*s) exchange rate policy. In addition, the model support
the view that the dollar peg blocs an advantageous rebalancing of the world
economy, a shift in demand towards the U.S., which su¤ers from a current
account decit and unemployment, and away from the dollar bloc countries,
which enjoy near full employment and have current account surpluses. This
provides an additional rationale for the U.S. to criticize the dollar bloc*s
exchange rate policy. The model therefore seems to explain quite well the
behavior of China and the U.S.: China returned to a tight dollar peg during
the U.S. nancial crisis, when the Fed cut interest rates aggressively and
China*s exchange rate policy has been a target of criticism in the U.S.
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Figure 1: Dynamic e¤ects of a U.S. monetary shock under  exible exchange
rates
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Figure 2: Dynamic e¤ects of a U.S. monetary shock under the dollar peg
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